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Short Selling and the Price Discovery Process
Ekkehart Boehmer
EDHEC Business School
Juan (Julie) Wu
University of Georgia
We show that stock prices are more accurate when short sellers are more active. First, in
a large panel of NYSE-listed stocks, intraday informational efficiency of prices improves
with greater shorting flow. Second, at monthly and annual horizons, more shorting flow
accelerates the incorporation of public information into prices. Third, greater shorting
flow reduces post-earnings-announcement drift for negative earnings surprises. Fourth,
short sellers change their trading around extreme return events in a way that aids price
discovery and reduces divergence from fundamental values. These results are robust
to various econometric specifications, and their magnitude is economically meaningful.
(JEL G14)
The consequences of short selling for share prices, market quality, and
information flow are still fervently debated by academics, securities market
regulators, and politicians. The informational efficiency of prices, a public
good, is a key attribute of capital markets that can have significant implications
for the real economy.1 Short sellers account for more than 20% of trading
volume and are generally regarded as traders with access to value-relevant
information (Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang 2008). This suggests that they play
an important role in the price discovery process. However, being informed
does not necessarily imply that their trading instantaneously impounds this
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information into prices—in fact, informed traders often have incentives to
trade in a way that minimizes information leakage. In this article, we use daily
data on short-selling flow and various dimensions of informational efficiency
to systematically quantify the effect of daily short-selling flow on the price
discovery process.
Financial theory takes different views on short sellers and the consequences
of their trading decisions on price discovery and, more generally, on market
quality. In some models, short sellers are rational informed traders who
promote efficiency by moving mispriced securities closer to their fundamentals
(see, e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia 1987). In other models, short sellers
follow manipulative and predatory trading strategies that result in less
informative prices (Goldstein and Guembel 2008) or cause overshooting of
prices (Brunnermeier and Pedersen 2005). Most empirical studies suggest that
short sellers are informed traders. Using either monthly short interest data (see,
e.g., Asquith and Meulbroek 1995; Dechow et al. 2001; Desai et al. 2002;
Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter 2005) or shorting flow data (see, e.g., Christophe,
Ferri, and Angel 2004; Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang 2008; Diether, Lee, and
Werner 2008), these authors document that short sellers have value-relevant
information and suggest that their trading helps correct overvaluation.
Our article connects to this point. In line with previous work, we agree that
short sellers’ information will eventually be incorporated into prices; going
beyond previous work, we use higher-frequency daily data on short-selling
flow to characterize more precisely how and when short sellers impact price
discovery. Most prior work uses monthly short interest reports to examine
whether short sellers anticipate future returns or changes in firm fundamentals
(see, e.g., Dechow et al. 2001; Karpoff and Lou 2010; Henry, Kisgen, and
Wu 2011). We take a different approach by directly focusing on short sellers’
daily trading activity and its impact on price discovery at different horizons.
This allows us to systematically examine whether short sellers’ information is
incorporated into prices and how quickly this takes place. Our daily flow data
are more appropriate for this analysis than are monthly snapshots of short
interest data when short sellers adopt short-term trading strategies.Indeed,
recent empirical evidence suggests that many short sellers are active short-
term traders. Between November 1998 and October 1999, Reed (2007) finds
that the median duration of a position in the equity lending market is three
days, and the mode is only one day. Diether, Lee, and Werner (2008) estimate
an average days-to-cover ratio of four to five days for a shorted stock in 2005.
These findings indicate that a large portion of recent short-selling activity is
short-term and indeed often limited to intraday horizons. Daily shorting flow
data allow us to capture the effect of these shorting activities on prices and
facilitate a more detailed analysis than monthly short interest data.
We use four distinct approaches when analyzing the effect of shorting on
informational efficiency. First, following Boehmer and Kelley (2009), we
construct transaction-based high-frequency measures of efficiency. Second,
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we adopt Hou and Moskowitz’s (2005) lower-frequency price-delay measure,
an estimate of how quickly prices incorporate public information. Third,
we use the well-established post-earnings-announcement drift anomaly (see
Ball and Brown 1968) as a measure of inefficiency and test whether short
sellers influence its magnitude. Fourth, we examine short selling around large
price movements and price reversals. By design, these four approaches are
complementary in their assumptions and allow us to examine the effects of
short selling on efficiency from different perspectives. Together, analyzing the
influence of short selling along those four distinct dimensions of informational
efficiency provides a detailed and integrated view on the role short sellers play
in equity markets.
Each of the four approaches suggests that short sellers improve the
informational efficiency of prices. First, more shorting flow reduces the
deviation of intraday transaction prices from a random walk, so more
shorting makes prices more efficient. Second, more shorting flow is associated
with shorter Hou-Moskowitz price delays, suggesting that prices incorporate
public information faster when short sellers are more active. Third, for the
most negative quartile of earnings surprises, an above-median increase in
shorting immediately after the earnings announcement eliminates the drift.
Fourth, we find no evidence that short sellers exacerbate large negative price
shocks. Conversely, their trading patterns seem to facilitate more accurate
pricing even on extreme return days. All these results are robust to different
econometric methods and specifications, and as we discuss in Section 7,
they are difficult to explain by reverse causality. Further analysis reveals that
the efficiency-enhancing effect of short selling is economically meaningful.
Overall, these findings suggest that short sellers play a critical role in facilitating
rational price discovery, a major function of capital markets, along several
dimensions.
Our article is related to several earlier studies on short selling. We
complement earlier work by Dechow et al. (2001), Desai et al. (2002),
Hirshleifer, Teoh, and Yu (2011), and others that examines the relation between
monthly short interest and variables related to firm fundamentals. These studies
typically benefit from long monthly time series. Our shorting flow data cover
only three years, but we can zoom in on the daily horizon and directly evaluate
the impact that shorting has on prices. As Richardson (2003) points out, higher
data frequency is important in identifying the impact of short selling on firm
fundamentals. We also complement earlier work by Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang
(2008) and Diether, Lee, and Werner (2008), who find that daily shorting
flows predict returns over horizons up to several months. Both of these sets
of studies suggest that the presence of short sellers is linked to some correction
of overvaluation. However, neither focuses on the questions of when exactly
short selling affects prices or how quickly their information is incorporated
into prices. Our first contribution is to complement these studies by focusing
directly on the link between daily shorting flows and four different measures
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of informational efficiency. We show that shorting flow indeed makes prices
more efficient and that this process begins at intraday horizons.
Our study is also related to prior work on short-selling constraints. Proxies
for shorting constraints include indicators for the practice and prohibition
of short selling across equity markets (Bris, Goetzmann, and Zhu 2007),
addition/removal of short-sale restrictions in certain stocks in Hong Kong
(Chang, Cheng, and Yu 2007), loan rates from a large U.S. security lender in the
late 1990s (Reed 2007), and data on share lending supply and borrowing fees
from U.S. and other equity markets (Saffi and Sigurdsson 2011). Focusing on
variation in shorting constraints and directly linking short sellers’actual trading
decisions to price efficiency are complementary approaches, and the latter
allows us to examine the consequences of short sellers’decisions more directly.
Our finding that short sellers enhance efficiency around earnings
announcements informs the growing body of literature on post-earnings-
announcement drift (initially documented in Ball and Brown 1968). Although
there is mounting evidence that post-earnings-announcement drift (PEAD) is
one of the more persistent anomalies in financial markets, empirical work on
shorting behavior in this context is quite limited. Using monthly short interest
data, Cao et al. (2007) find relatively weak evidence that short sellers reduce
drift, but Lasser, Wang, and Zhang (2010) argue that short interest is not
related to PEAD in the expected manner. Even with intraday shorting flows,
Zheng (2009) finds no evidence that short sellers affect PEAD. Berkman and
McKenzie (2012) find that short selling (proxied by loaned shares in the equity
lending market) increases after negative earnings shocks but conclude that it
does not remove long-term PEAD measured over the quarter following the
earnings announcement. We contribute detailed daily evidence to this debate.
Consistent with Berkman and McKenzie (2012), we find that shorting increases
after negative earnings surprises. Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2008) show that
the ability of daily short selling to predict future returns dissipates roughly one
month after portfolio formation. Thus, short sellers’ ability to exploit PEAD
should be strongest during the month after the earnings announcement. We find
that short selling eliminates PEAD over this horizon in the stocks with negative
surprises where short sellers are most active. Overall, these tests also benefit
from the daily nature of our data on shorting flows, which allows us to create
more powerful tests than would be possible based on monthly short interest
reports. Different from the above studies, our new result in this respect is that
the activity of short sellers eliminates PEAD at least in some stocks, and this
happens fairly quickly, further supporting the positive role of short sellers in
promoting efficient pricing.
Finally, our analysis provides important guidance for current worldwide
debates regarding the optimal regulation of short selling.2 Our article
2 Anecdotal evidence indeed goes both ways. Jim Chanos, president of Kynikos Associates (the largest fund
specializing in short selling), is best known for being one of the first to spot problems with Enron. However,
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contributes to these debates by systematically highlighting how short sellers
help increase market quality and illustrating specific ways in which this
occurs.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 1 describes
the data and our sample. Section 2 introduces our measures of relative
informational efficiency. Section 3 analyzes the relation between short selling
and high-frequency measures of efficiency, whereas Section 4 looks at
the relation between shorting and low-frequency measures of efficiency. In
Section 5, we describe our event-based analysis that relates post-earnings-
announcements drift to shorting activity, and in Section 6, we examine short
selling around extreme return events. In Section 7, we describe several
robustness tests and provide some evidence on causality. Section 8 concludes
the article.
1. Data and Sample
The shorting flow data used in this article are published by the NYSE under the
Regulation SHO pilot program and are available from January 2005 through
June 2007.3 We augment the shorting data by identical, proprietary data
obtained from the NYSE that cover the remaining six months of 2007. For
each trade, our data include the size of the portion transacted by short sellers,
if any. We aggregate the intraday shorting flow that is executed during normal
trading hours into daily observations. This sample is limited to a three-year
period, but the daily frequency of these flow data allows for more powerful and
more accurate tests than those constructed from the monthly short interest data
that are used in many of the earlier studies.
We match the daily shorting flow data with the Center for Research in
Security Prices (CRSP) database to obtain daily returns, consolidated trading
volume, closing prices, and shares outstanding. We include only domestic
common stocks (share codes 10 and 11) in the analysis but exclude Berkshire
Hathaway Class A and B shares, which are priced around $3,000 and near
$100,000, respectively, during the sample period. We compute daily liquidity
and price efficiency measures from the NYSE’s Trades and Quotes (TAQ) data.
On an average day, our final sample covers 1,361 stocks.
2. Measuring Price Discovery
We employ four different approaches to measure how efficiently prices
incorporate information. First, our most powerful tests focus on high-frequency
some high-profile lawsuits, including Biovail, a Canadian pharmaceutical company suing hedge fund SAC, and
Overstock.com, suing Rocker Partners, accuse short sellers of manipulating their stock prices.
3 Regulation SHO initiated by the SEC aims to “study the effects of relatively unrestricted short selling on
market volatility, price efficiency, and liquidity” (see Regulation SHO-Pilot Program, April 19, 2005, at
www.sec.gov/spotlight/shopilot.htm).
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measures of the relative informational efficiency of prices. We measure how
closely transaction prices move relative to a random walk and conduct tests
at the daily frequency to relate these measures to short-selling flow. Second,
we use a longer-horizon measure based on daily and weekly returns. These
tests consider the speed with which public information is incorporated into
prices over horizons ranging from one month to one year. Third, we exploit
the well-documented post-earnings-announcement drift to study the effect
of short selling in an event-based context. Fourth, we identify unusually
large price changes that are later reversed, and we look at short selling
around these changes. Extreme price movements are useful in evaluating
the motivation for short selling, because they shed light on whether short
sellers trade with the intention to exacerbate or reduce and reverse large price
declines.
2.1 High-frequency informational efficiency
We use two different measures to capture the relative efficiency of transaction
prices—the pricing error as suggested in Hasbrouck (1993) and the absolute
value of intraday return autocorrelations. Both measures are computed from
intraday transactions or quote data, and both capture temporary deviations from
a random walk (see Boehmer and Kelley 2009). Recent empirical evidence in
Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2005) supports this short-term view. Their
analysis suggests that “astute traders” monitor the market intently and most
information is incorporated into prices within 30 minutes through their trading
activities. As a result, transaction-based efficiency measures capture temporary
deviations from fundamental values well.
We follow Hasbrouck (1993) and Boehmer and Kelley (2009) in computing
pricing errors (see the Appendix for details). We decompose the observed (log)
transaction price, pt , into an efficient price (random walk) component, mt , and
a stationary component, the pricing error st . The efficient price is assumed to
be nonstationary and is defined as a security’s expected value conditional on all
available information, including public information and the portion of private
information that can be inferred from order flow. The pricing error, which
measures the temporary deviation between the actual transaction price and the
efficient price, reflects information-unrelated frictions in the market (such as
price discreteness, inventory control effects, and other transient components
of trade execution costs). To compute the pricing error, we use all trades and
execution prices of a stock. We estimate a vector autoregression (VAR) model to
separate changes in the efficient price from transient price changes. Because the
pricing error is assumed to follow a zero-mean covariance-stationary process,
its dispersion, σ (s), is a measure of its magnitude. In our empirical analysis,
we standardize σ (s) by the dispersion of intraday transaction prices, σ (p),
to control for cross-sectional differences in price volatility. Henceforth, this
ratio σ (s)/σ (p) is referred to as the “pricing error” for brevity. To reduce the
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influence of outliers, the dispersion of the pricing error is required to be less
than dispersion of intraday transaction prices.4
Our second short-term measure of relative price efficiency is the absolute
value of quote midpoint return autocorrelations. The intuition is that if the quote
midpoint is the market’s best estimate of the equilibrium value of the stock at
any point in time, an efficient price process implies that quote midpoints follow
a random walk. Therefore, quote midpoints should exhibit less autocorrelation
in either direction and a smaller absolute value of autocorrelation indicates
greater price efficiency. To estimate quote midpoint return autocorrelations,
we choose a thirty-minute interval (results are qualitatively identical for five-
and ten-minute return intervals) based on the results from Chordia, Roll, and
Subrahmanyam (2005). We use |AR30| to denote the absolute value of this
autocorrelation.
In the context of price discovery, pricing errors are easier to interpret than
autocorrelations, because only pricing errors differentiate between information-
related and information-unrelated price changes. By construction, pricing errors
only attribute information-unrelated price changes to deviations from a random
walk, whereas autocorrelations incorporate all price changes. For example,
splitting a large order by an informed trader would produce zero pricing error
because prices change to reflect information from the informed order flow,
but it would generate a positive autocorrelation. As price adjustments due to
new information are not reflections of inefficiencies, pricing errors are a more
sensible measure of the relative informational efficiency of prices.
2.2 Low-frequency informational efficiency
Hou and Moskowitz (2005) introduce price delays—a low-frequency measure
of relative efficiency that relies on the speed of adjustment to market-wide
information.5 We replicate their annual delay measure and, additionally, create
an analogous monthly measure. For the annual measure, we follow their
approach and compute weekly Wednesday-to-Wednesday returns for each
stock. We regress these returns on contemporaneous and four weeks of lagged
market returns over one calendar year. Specifically, we run the following
regression:
rj,t =αj +βjRm,t +
4∑
n=1
δjnRm,t,n +εj,t , (1)
4 Boehmer, Saar, and Yu (2005) apply Hasbrouck’s (1993) method to study the effect of the increased pretrade
transparency associated with the introduction of OpenBook on the NYSE on stock price efficiency. Boehmer and
Kelley (2009) find that institutions contribute to price efficiency using similar approaches. Hotchkiss and Ronen
(2002) examine the informational efficiency of corporate bond prices using a simplified procedure suggested by
Hasbrouck (1993).
5 See, for example, Griffin, Kelly, and Nardari (2010) and Saffi and Sigurdsson (2011) for applications in an
international context.
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where rj,t is the return on stock j and Rm,t is the value-weighted market return
in week t . Then, we estimate a second regression that restricts the coefficients
on lagged market returns to zero. The delay measure is calculated as 1−[(R2
(restricted model) /R2 (unrestricted model)].6 Similar to an F-test, this measure
captures the portion of individual stock return variation that is explained by
lagged market returns. A larger delay means a less efficient stock price, in the
sense that it takes longer for the stock to incorporate market-wide information.
Relative to the high-frequency efficiency measures, a stock’s price delay
describes the price discovery process over a much longer horizon. Instead of
transaction-to-transaction return dynamics, the delay measure assesses week-
to-week return patterns. Yet, the (untabulated) correlation between annual price
delays and the annual averages of daily efficiency measures ranges from 0.2
to 0.3, suggesting that these measures mostly capture different aspects of
efficiency but also have a common component.7
Our analysis covers three years of data, so using an annual variable limits the
precision with which we can estimate relations between short selling and price
delays. To construct a more powerful test, we modify Hou and Moskowitz’s
approach and compute monthly price delays using daily, rather than weekly,
observations and five days of lagged market returns in regression (1). We require
a minimum of fifteen observations per firm per month to compute a monthly
price delay. We obtain qualitatively and statistically similar results using annual
and monthly delays and report only the latter because of our short sample period.
Finally, we exploit the potential asymmetry in price adjustment speed.
Because short sellers primarily benefit from price declines, we expect that
information gets incorporated faster with more shorting when market-wide
information is negative. We modify the above unrestricted models to isolate
negative market returns:
rj,t =αj +βjR−m,t +
5∑
n=1
δ−nj R
−
m,t−n +εj,t , (2)
where R−m,t equals the daily market return when it is negative. We then use
the R2 from the modified unrestricted model in the denominator to calculate a
modified delay measure that captures price adjustment to negative information.
2.3 Post-earnings-announcement drift
Post-earnings-announcement drift is a well-established financial phenomenon
that indicates some degree of informational inefficiency in the capital markets.
6 To reduce noise in this measure, we require a stock to have at least twenty weekly returns during a calendar year.
7 Another low-frequency relative efficiency measure is the R2 from a market model regression as suggested in
Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000). They argue that lower R2 indicates more firm-specific information and can
thus be used as a measure of information efficiency of stock prices. However, recent work casts doubt on this
interpretation and suggests that R2 does not capture information well (Griffin, Kelly, and Nardari 2010; Saffi
and Sigurdsson 2011).
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Ball and Brown (1968) first document that abnormal returns of stocks with
positive earnings surprises tend to remain positive for several weeks following
the earnings announcement and remain negative for stocks with negative
surprises. This return pattern generates an arbitrage opportunity for savvy
traders. If short sellers are sophisticated traders who attempt to exploit this
opportunity, we expect shorting to increase immediately following negative
earnings surprises. If short sellers make prices more informationally efficient,
the increased shorting activity following negative surprises should attenuate the
post-earnings-announcement drift. We use this event-based test to supplement
our previous two measures of informational efficiency.
Battalio and Mendenhall (2005) and Livnat and Mendenhall (2006) show that
earnings surprise measures based on analyst forecasts are easier to interpret than
those obtained from a time-series model of (Compustat) earnings, because the
former are not subject to issues, such as earnings restatement and special items.
We compute earnings surprises as the difference between actual earnings and
the most recent monthly I/B/E/S consensus forecasts, scaled by the stock price
two days before the announcement date. We construct abnormal returns as a
stock’s raw returns net of value-weighted market returns and measure the drift
as the cumulative abnormal return following each earnings surprise.
2.4 Return reversals at the daily frequency
Opponents of unrestricted short selling often allege that short selling puts
excess downward pressure on prices.8 As a result, these opponents claim,
prices are too low relative to fundamental values when short sellers are active.
A related allegation is that short sellers can manipulate prices by shorting
intensely, thereby driving prices down below their efficient values. Once these
stocks are undervalued, the short sellers could then cover their positions as the
true valuations are slowly revealed and prices reverse toward their efficient
values. Both of these scenarios imply that short sellers are more active on
days when prices decline and especially so when these declines are not related
to fundamental information. We provide evidence on this issue by selecting
large price moves and looking at short sellers’ behavior around these extreme
return days.
3. Shorting Flow and the Short-horizon Efficiency of Transaction Prices
Relative short-horizon efficiency describes how closely transaction prices
follow a random walk, and we estimate how short-selling flow affects the
degree of short-term efficiency. We regress daily measures of efficiency on
lagged shorting and control variables. As the relevant measures of efficiency
and shorting are available at the daily frequency, these tests are quite powerful.
8 For public concerns or issuers’ comments, see SEC Release No. 34-58592 or the NYSE survey on short selling
(“Short selling study: The views of corporate issuers,” October 17, 2008).
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We use the following basic model to test hypotheses about the effect of short
selling on efficiency:
Efficiencyi,t =αt +βtShortingi,t−1 +γtControlsi,t−1 +εi,t . (3)
The dependent variable is either the pricing error, σ (s)/σ (p), or the absolute
value of midquote return autocorrelation, |AR30|. Following Boehmer, Jones,
and Zhang (2008), we standardize daily shorting flow by the stock’s daily
share trading volume. This standardization makes shorting activity comparable
across stocks with different trading volumes. If more shorting systematically
contributes to greater price efficiency, stock prices should deviate less from
a random walk, implying a negative β. We lag all explanatory variables by
one period to mitigate possible effects of changes in price efficiency on these
contemporaneous explanatory variables.9
Extant research suggests several control variables that are potentially
associated with price efficiency. We include measures of execution costs, order
imbalances, share price, market capitalization, and trading volume as controls
in our base regressions. To measure execution costs, we use relative effective
spreads (measured as twice the distance between the execution price and the
prevailing quote midpoint scaled by the prevailing quote midpoint).10 Higher
execution costs make arbitrage less profitable and therefore deter the entrance
of sophisticated traders, whose trading helps keep prices in line with their
fundamentals. This reasoning suggests that stocks with higher trading costs
tend to deviate more from their fundamental values and thus are less efficiently
priced. Another variable that may be closely related to price (in)efficiency is
one-sided trading pressure. If excess demand is not immediately absorbed by
liquidity providers on the other side of the imbalance, less efficient prices
will result, at least temporarily. If short selling is related to the degree of
one-sided trading pressure in either direction, our results may not reflect the
effect of shorting but rather the liquidity needs of other traders. We control
for this possibility by including the absolute value of order imbalances in the
regressions. We use Lee and Ready’s (1991) algorithm to classify trades into
buy-signed trades, where buyers are more aggressive than sellers, and sell-
signed trades, where sellers are more aggressive than buyers. We compute
daily order imbalance for each stock as the difference between buy-signed and
sell-signed volume scaled by total trading volume.
We include the volume-weighted average price (VWAP) to control for
differences in price discreteness that can potentially affect efficiency.11 Larger
9 The lagged explanatory variables can be interpreted as instruments for their contemporaneous values. Results
using contemporaneous values are qualitatively the same.
10 Controlling for relative effective spreads serves another purpose in the pricing error regression. The pricing error
reflects the information-uncorrelated (i.e., temporary) portion of total price variance. Because the effective spread
measures the total price impact of a trade and thus could conceivably be related to the pricing error, controlling
for it can help isolate changes in efficiency from changes in liquidity.
11 Using closing prices produces qualitatively identical results.
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and more actively traded stocks may be easier to value. Moreover, Chordia
and Swaminathan (2000) show that, after controlling for size, high-volume
stocks tend to respond more quickly to information in market returns than do
low-volume stocks. Thus, we include both variables in our models. As the
natural logs of trading volume and market capitalization are highly correlated
(the correlation coefficient is 0.75), we orthogonalize volume with respect to
size. Specifically, throughout the article, we use residuals from regressing log
volume on log of market capitalization. Results remain qualitatively similar
without this orthogonalization. We include the lagged dependent variable to
control for potential persistence in relative price efficiency.12
Recent literature suggests two additional important variables that should be
considered in studying price efficiency. First, because analyst coverage can
improve a firm’s informational environment, we control for the number of
sell-side analysts lagged by one month (Brennan and Subrahmanyam 1995).
We obtain the monthly number of analysts producing annual forecasts from
I/B/E/S. Second, Boehmer and Kelley (2009) find that institutional investors
contribute to greater informational efficiency. We control for institutional
holdings so we can focus on the marginal effect of shorting over and above
the effect of institutional holdings. As in Boehmer and Kelley (2009), we use
lagged quarterly holdings from the 13F filings in the CDA Spectrum database
standardized by the number of a firm’s shares outstanding.
3.1 Descriptive statistics
Panel A in Table 1 presents time-series means of cross-sectional summary
statistics for the main variables in our analysis. Relative shorting volume
accounts for close to 20% of total trading volume during the sample period.
A 10% standard deviation reveals a large variation in shorting activity
across stocks. Price efficiency measures also exhibit substantial cross-sectional
variation. Because firm size, trading volume, share price, and number of
analysts are skewed, we use their natural logarithms in our estimation.
Panel B in Table 1 reports time-series averages of monthly cross-sectional
correlations between shorting and price efficiency. The three measures of
informational efficiency are positively correlated. Correlations range from 0.07
(between delay and |AR30|) to 0.23 (between delay and pricing error). This
suggests that these three measures have a common component but mostly
capture different aspects of price efficiency. It is notable that each of the three
price efficiency measures is negatively related to shorting, which provides
initial evidence that short selling is associated with greater relative price
efficiency. Of course, these correlations are only suggestive, and we conduct
more rigorous tests to formalize this observation.
12 Whereas price volatility is conceivably related to short-term efficiency, both of our dependent variables are
already scaled by a volatility measure. Therefore, we do not add volatility as an explanatory variable to the
model.
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Table 1
Summary statistics
Panel A: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Median SD
σ (s)/σ (p) 0.095 0.062 0.104
|AR30| 0.248 0.218 0.177
Shorting (%) 19.7 18.4 9.9
Volume (Thousands) 1,530.893 542.210 3,639.900
RES 0.0011 0.0007 0.0012
VWAP ($) 36.39 31.91 25.25
Price ($) 36.42 31.90 25.31
|OIB| 0.154 0.118 0.146
Size ($Billions) 8.808 2.185 25.479
InstOwn (%) 69.9 75.1 21.5
NumAnalyst 10 8 6
Panel B: Average monthly correlation between shorting and efficiency
σ (s)/σ (p) |AR30| Price delay
σ (s)/σ (p) 1.00
|AR30| 0.15 1.00
Price delay 0.23 0.07 1.00
Shorting −0.16 −0.06 −0.14
The sample includes a daily average of 1,361 NYSE-listed common stocks from January 2005 to December 2007.
Panel A reports time-series means of daily cross-sectional summary statistics. σ (s) is the standard deviation of the
discrepancies between log transaction price and the efficient price based on Hasbrouck (1993). σ (p) is the standard
deviation of intraday transaction prices. |AR30| is the absolute value of the thirty-minute quote midpoint return
autocorrelation. Shorting is calculated as shares shorted standardized by trading volume on a given stock day.
Volume is daily share trading volume. RES is daily volume-weighted relative effective spreads. VWAP is daily
volume-weighted average price. Price is a stock’s daily closing price. |OIB| is the absolute value of daily share
order imbalance standardized by share volume, where order imbalance is the difference between buyer-initiated
trades and seller-initiated trades based on Lee and Ready’s (1991) algorithm. Size is daily market value of equity
measured as price times shares outstanding. InstOwn is the fraction of shares outstanding owned by institutions
at the end of each quarter. NumAnalyst is monthly number of sell-side analysts producing annual forecast of
firm earnings. Panel B reports the time-series averages of monthly cross-sectional correlations between shorting
and three efficiency measures, σ (s)/σ (p), |AR30|, and monthly price delay estimated analogously to the annual
price delay in Hou and Moskowitz (2005).
3.2 Basic result
We employ a standard Fama and MacBeth (1973) two-step procedure to
estimate Model 3. In the first stage, we run daily cross-sectional regressions of
price efficiency on lagged shorting activity and controls. In the second stage, we
draw inferences from the time-series average of these regression coefficients.
This method picks up the cross-sectional effect of shorting on price efficiency
and is less susceptible to cross-sectional correlations among regression errors
than a pooled cross-sectional time-series regression. To correct for potential
autocorrelation in the estimated coefficients, we report Newey-West standard
errors with five lags.13
Table 2 contains the regression results. Models 1 and 2 use pricing errors
as the efficiency measure, whereas Models 3 and 4 use Ln|AR30|. For each
measure, we present the base model and a model augmented by the number
of analysts and institutional holdings. Lagged daily shorting flow has a
13 Results are not sensitive to other reasonable lag lengths for Newey-West standard errors.
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Table 2
Fama-MacBeth regressions of high-frequency price efficiency on shorting flow
σ (s)/σ (p) σ (s)/σ (p) Ln|AR30| Ln|AR30|
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Coef p-Values Coef p-Values Coef p-Values Coef p-Values
Intercept 0.250 0.00 0.241 0.00 −1.613 0.00 −1.599 0.00
LagShorting −0.066 0.00 −0.049 0.00 −0.072 0.00 −0.093 0.00
LagLnVWAP −0.013 0.00 −0.012 0.00 −0.011 0.00 −0.010 0.01
LagLnsize −0.011 0.00 −0.009 0.00 −0.008 0.00 −0.004 0.02
LagLnVolume −0.019 0.00 −0.015 0.00 −0.011 0.00 −0.012 0.00
LagRES 16.571 0.00 17.439 0.00 −3.281 0.00 −2.634 0.09
Lag|OIB| 0.048 0.00 0.039 0.00 0.003 0.78 0.019 0.10
LagDV 0.432 0.00 0.393 0.00 0.004 0.00 0.004 0.00
LagInstOwn −0.022 0.00 −0.003 0.73
LagLnNumAnalyst*100 −0.002 0.00 −0.010 0.00
Adjusted R2 0.505 0.474 0.003 0.004
This table reports daily Fama-MacBeth regression results for NYSE-listed common stocks from January 2005 to
December 2007. σ (s) is the standard deviation of the discrepancies between log transaction price and the efficient
price based on Hasbrouck (1993). σ (p) is the standard deviation of intraday transaction prices. |AR30| is the
absolute value of the thirty-minute quote midpoint return autocorrelation. Shorting is shares shorted standardized
by shares traded on a given stock day. RES is the daily value-weighted relative effective spreads. VWAP is
daily volume-weighted average price. Size is the market value of equity. Volume is daily share trading volume
orthogonalized with respect to size. |OIB| is the absolute value of daily share order imbalance standardized
by share volume, where order imbalance is the difference between buyer-initiated trades and seller-initiated
trades based on Lee and Ready’s (1991) algorithm. DV is the dependent variable. InstOwn is the fraction of
shares outstanding owned by institutions. NumAnalyst*100 is the number of sell-side analysts producing annual
forecast of firm earnings (scaled up by 100). Lag refers to the first-order lagged value. Daily variables are lagged
one day, InstOwn is lagged one quarter, and NumAnalyst is lagged one month. Ln refers to the natural logarithm.
The p-values are based on Newey-West standard errors.
significant and negative coefficient in each of these specifications. Controlling
for other potential determinants of efficiency, greater shorting flow is associated
with smaller pricing errors and smaller autocorrelation and thus faster price
discovery. In other words, short selling is associated with prices that deviate
less from a random walk and hence are more informationally efficient.14
The coefficients of most control variables exhibit the expected signs. Larger
relative effective spreads (RES) and larger absolute order imbalances (|OIB|)
are associated with larger pricing errors. This makes sense because higher
transaction costs prevent arbitrageurs from trading on some price deviations
and therefore lead to lower efficiency. Greater |OIB| implies larger one-sided
trading pressure, which is also associated with lower efficiency. Larger and more
actively traded stocks are associated with smaller pricing errors. Consistent
with prior literature, greater analyst coverage and more institutional holdings
promote efficiency (Boehmer and Kelley 2009). For |AR30|, some control
variables (RES and |OIB|) have different signs or are not significant, but the
14 The dependent variable in Models 1 and 2 in Table 2 is the ratio σ (s)/σ (p). Thus, the efficiency-enhancing effect
of short selling could conceivably arise only because shorting inflates σ (p), the standard deviation of share prices
over time. We can dismiss this possibility empirically. In unreported regressions similar to Model 2, but with
σ (s) as the dependent variable, we find that the coefficient on lag shorting is significantly negative even when
we control for σ (p). Thus, an increase in shorting appears to reduce the pricing error per se, rather than inflate
total variance.
299
[11:21 28/12/2012 OEP-hhs097.tex] Page: 300 287–322
The Review of Financial Studies / v 26 n 2 2013
main result is qualitatively the same: more short selling appears to reduce
midquote autocorrelation and therefore improves efficiency.
3.3 Economic magnitude of shorting’s effect on price efficiency
We adopt three complementary strategies for gauging the economic magnitude
of short selling–induced changes in efficiency. First, we express the effect of
short selling in terms of efficiency standard deviations. Second, we compare
the impact of short selling to that of analyst coverage and institutional holdings,
which are known determinants of efficiency (see Boehmer and Kelley 2009).
Third, we estimate how short selling relates to the half-life of a stock’s
pricing error.
For the baseline Model 1 in Table 2, the coefficient of shorting is −0.066. If
shorting increases by one standard deviation (0.099 in Table 1), this coefficient
implies that efficiency improves by 0.066*0.099 = 0.0065, which amounts to
roughly 10% of the mean pricing error (0.095 in Table 1).Alternatively, moving
from a stock where shorting is not possible to a stock with median shorting
(0.184 in Table 1), the Hasbrouck pricing error declines by 0.066*0.184 =
0.012, or by roughly 20% of the median pricing error (0.062 in Table 1).
These illustrations suggest that the magnitude of short sellers’ impact on
price efficiency is economically meaningful. Moreover, these estimates suggest
dramatic aggregate effects when broad events, such as shorting bans, affect the
ability to short in several stocks contemporaneously.
A second way to put the impact of shorting into perspective is to compare the
relative influence of institutional holdings, analyst coverage, and short selling.
Specifically, in Model 2, a one-standard-deviation (0.0992) increase in short
selling is associated with a 0.049*0.0992 = 0.0049 decline in pricing errors.
A one-standard-deviation increase in LnNumEst100 (0.6945) and InstOwn
(0.2146) is associated with pricing error reductions of 0.002*0.6945 = 0.0014
and 0.022*0.2146 = 0.0047, respectively. Based on this comparison, variation
in short selling has a similar economic effect on efficiency as variation in
institutional holdings.At the same time, both shorting and institutional holdings
are three times as influential for price efficiency as is analyst coverage.
Third, we examine the association between shorting activity and the half-life
of a stock’s pricing errors. The half-life represents the time it takes to reduce
pricing errors by half, and it is thus one possible measure of how quickly
prices incorporate information. Analogous to Hansch (2004), we estimate the
following daily stock-level regression:
Efficiencyd =α+βd+ρEfficiencyd−1 +
2∑
i=1
δEfficiencyd−i +εd, (4)
where efficiencyd denotes the pricing error on day d . In this specification, the
coefficientρ captures mean reversion in efficiency, and the estimated half-life of
pricing errors is –ln2/ρ. We estimate Model 4 and compute the half-life for each
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stock in our sample (not tabulated). We then regress ln(half-life) on lag shorting
and the same controls as in Table 2. To ease interpretation, all explanatory
variables are transformed into decile ranks and then scaled to have a value
ranging from zero to one. The coefficient on shorting is roughly −0.2(t =5.37),
implying that the half-life of the pricing error decreases by e−0.2 =0.8 days when
moving a stock from the lowest to the highest shorting decile when controlling
for other potential determinants of price discovery. For comparison, the half-
life of stocks in the lowest shorting decile is 1.6 days. Against this benchmark,
facilitating short selling doubles the speed at which information is incorporated
into prices. We obtain qualitatively identical results when we use continuous
explanatory variables.
Overall, these comparisons illustrate that short selling is an important
economic driver of price discovery. In the next sections, we show that this
basic result is robust to different measures of price discovery, and in Section 7
we show that these results are not likely to be driven by reverse causality.
4. Short-selling Flow and Price Delays
Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2005) point out that price discovery occurs
mainly within a trading day, and Boehmer and Kelley (2009) find evidence in
this direction. However, if prices diverge from fundamentals for periods longer
than one day (Dechow et al. 2001), such intraday analysis could erroneously
interpret “riding the bubble” behavior as short-term reversion to fundamentals.
For this reason alone, it is important to assess the effect of short selling on
informational efficiency over longer horizons. In this section, we examine
how shorting affects price delays, an efficiency measure estimated at monthly
and annual horizons. Price delays reflect the sensitivity of a firm’s returns
to contemporaneous and lagged market returns and measure how quickly
market-wide information is incorporated into stock prices (Hou and Moskowitz
2005).
To make the results comparable to those in the main tests in Table 2, we
include similar control variables. The main difference is that a daily panel
underlies Table 2, whereas a monthly panel underlies the price delay tests
in this section. In Table 3, we present monthly Fama-MacBeth regressions
with Newey-West standard errors (Model 1) and a two-way fixed effect model
(Model 2). In untabulated tests, we obtain qualitatively identical results using
an annual panel as originally suggested in Hou and Moskowitz (2005).15
We report two different analyses in Table 3—the effect of monthly delays
in general (Panel A) and the effect of only negative information (Panel B).
Short selling significantly attenuates price delays in both panels, for both the
Fama-MacBeth and the fixed-effects models. This suggests that stocks with
15 Pooled regressions with month clusters produce similar results.
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Table 3
Monthly regression of price delays on shorting
Model 1 Model 2
Fama-MacBeth Fixed effects
Coef p-Values Coef p-Values
Panel A: Delays
LagShorting −0.365 0.00 −0.160 0.00
LagLnVWAP −0.019 0.00 −0.028 0.01
LagLnsize −0.020 0.00 −0.057 0.00
LagLnVolume −0.004 0.57 −0.024 0.00
LagRES 12.794 0.00 2.601 0.24
Lag|OIB| 0.211 0.00 0.034 0.20
LagDV 0.165 0.00 0.017 0.00
LagInstOwn 0.001 0.94 −0.031 0.15
LagLnNumAnalyst*100 0.027 0.00 −0.021 0.00
Adjusted R2 0.107 0.280
Panel B: Price adjustment efficiency to negative news
LagShorting −0.528 0.00 −0.189 0.00
LagLnVWAP −0.027 0.00 −0.022 0.15
LagLnsize −0.028 0.00 −0.061 0.00
LagLnVolume −0.005 0.62 −0.029 0.00
LagRES 14.175 0.01 3.076 0.37
Lag|OIB| 0.282 0.00 0.048 0.25
LagDV 0.125 0.00 −0.010 0.05
LagInstOwn 0.000 0.99 −0.045 0.19
LagLnNumAnalyst*100 0.039 0.00 −0.028 0.00
Adjusted R2 0.078 0.215
This table reports results for monthly Fama-MacBeth regressions with p-value based on Newey-West standard
errors (Model 1) and a firm and month fixed effects panel estimation (Model 2) for NYSE-listed common stocks
from January 2005 to December 2007. The dependent variable in Panel A is the monthly price delay, estimated
analogously to the annual delay in Hou and Moskowitz (2005). The dependent variable in Panel B is a modified
price delay that uses only down market returns in the restricted model. Shorting is the monthly average of
daily shares shorted standardized by shares traded. RES is the monthly average of daily value-weighted relative
effective spreads. |OIB| is the monthly average of daily absolute value of share order imbalance standardized
by share volume. VWAP is the monthly average of daily volume-weighted average price. Size is the monthly
average of a firm’s daily market value of equity. Volume is monthly share trading volume orthogonalized with
respect to size. DV is the dependent variable. InstOwn is the fraction of shares outstanding owned by institutions
in the most recent quarter. NumAnalyst*100 is the number of sell-side analysts producing monthly forecasts of
firm earnings (scaled up by 100). Ln refers to the natural logarithm. Lag refers to the first-order lagged value.
InstOwn is lagged one quarter, and all other variables are lagged one month. Regression intercepts are included
but not tabulated.
more shorting activity incorporate public information significantly faster into
prices than those with less shorting. As expected, the effect is between 18% and
45% stronger for negative information, depending on whether we use Fama-
MacBeth or the fixed-effects panel for estimation.
To better understand the economic significance of these effects, we look
at their absolute magnitude by itself and also compare it to the impact that
institutional holdings and analyst coverage have on delays. Based on Model 1 in
Panel A, we calculate that a one-standard-deviation increase in shorting (0.068
at monthly frequency) reduces delay by 0.365∗0.068=0.092. This reduction
corresponds to 21% of the median delay (0.437), or 0.34 of its standard deviation
(0.272). This suggests that the economic importance is greater using the delay
302
[11:21 28/12/2012 OEP-hhs097.tex] Page: 303 287–322
Short Selling and the Price Discovery Process
measure than for the intraday analysis. Moreover, neither analyst coverage nor
institutional holdings improve efficiency in this model. In fact, institutional
ownership is not significant in any of the four models in Table 3, and analyst
coverage is associated with better efficiency only in the fixed effects models.
Taken together, these observations indicate that shorting’s impact on efficiency
is economically meaningful, and it clearly dominates the impact of institutional
holdings and, to a large extent, that of analyst coverage.
These findings substantiate the core result that shorting enhances the
informational efficiency of prices. Specifically, price delays and our transaction-
based approach in Table 2 reflect quite different dimensions of the price
discovery process. This suggests that the efficiency improvements that are
associated with short selling manifest themselves both in intraday transactions
prices and in low-frequency measures of price discovery.
5. Short Selling and Post-earnings-announcement Drift
Returns tend to be positive after positive earnings surprises and negative after
negative surprises—in other words, prices seemingly do not fully incorporate
earnings-related information at the time of the announcement (see Ball and
Brown 1968). Bernard and Thomas (1989, 1990) suggest that such post-
earnings-announcement drift (PEAD) is a manifestation of investors’ failure
to recognize the information in the earnings surprises. Because prices tend to
drift upward (downward) following a positive (negative) earnings shock, this
predictable pattern creates a potential arbitrage opportunity for savvy traders.
We have two hypotheses about short selling in the context of PEAD. First, if
short sellers are sophisticated traders who attempt to exploit this opportunity,
we expect more shorting immediately following negative earnings surprises.
Second, if short sellers enhance efficiency and are successful in aiding the
price discovery process, the increased shorting activity after negative surprises
should at least attenuate PEAD. To test these hypotheses, we examine the two
weeks following the announcement, because this is when we expect active short
sellers to have the strongest influence on stock prices. After looking at short-
term and long-term measures of informational efficiency, this event-based test
is our third main approach to examining the relation between shorting and the
price discovery process.
In this section, we report some descriptive statistics for shorting around both
positive and negative earnings surprises, but we concentrate our analysis on
the response of short sellers to negative surprises. We do this because it is
not clear how to interpret changes in short selling after positive surprises.
For example, suppose short sellers know the true value of a stock and
observe that the market underreacts to the negative information in an earnings
announcement. Then, traders would short more intensely to take advantage
of this arbitrage opportunity, and our test is designed to detect this change in
shorting activity. But, if short sellers observe that the market underreacts to the
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positive information in an announcement, they can react in two ways—either
by reducing shorting or by increasing purchases. However, more likely than
not, traders do not have a short transaction planned for this day, and thus it is
more likely that the response will be more intense purchases, rather than less
intense shorting. Unfortunately, we cannot observe the long transactions of the
short sellers in our sample, which makes the effects of short selling around
positive surprises hard to interpret. For this reason, our analysis in this section
focuses on negative earnings surprises.
Our sample covers 15,536 earnings announcement events. We use a simple
portfolio approach to examine how short sellers respond to earnings surprises.
Specifically, each quarter, we sort firms into quartile portfolios, according
to the earnings surprise measures, with quartile 1 containing stocks with
the most negative surprises and quartile 4 containing those with the most
positive surprises. To check whether PEAD is present during our sample period,
we compute announcement-related cumulative abnormal returns (CARs),
defined as a stock’s raw return minus the value-weighted market returns.
Table 4 reports equally weighted CARs for each quartile. Consistent with
prior findings, the announcement effects are very strong: abnormal returns
during the three-day window (−1, 1) centered on the announcement date are
large and negative (−3.26%) for portfolios with the most negative surprises
and are large and positive (3.40%) for positive surprises. More importantly,
we observe significant PEAD for each but the third largest surprise quartile:
prices of stocks with good (bad) surprises continue to drift upward (downward)
after the announcement. Finally, PEAD is monotonic across quartiles—one-
week cumulative abnormal returns starting from the second day after the
announcement date (2, 6) increase monotonically from −0.75% for stocks
with the most negative surprises to 0.42% for stocks with the most positive
surprises.
We now address our hypotheses that (1) short sellers view the drift period as a
mispricing episode and trade accordingly and (2) this promotes price discovery.
If short sellers understand and seek to exploit the arbitrage opportunity
associated with post-earnings-announcement drift, they will short stocks more
intensively in quartile 1 right after observing the market reaction to the
announcement.
We first look at shorting and returns graphically in Figure 1. Panel A shows
CAR and shorting for negative surprises (Q1). We make several interesting
observations. First, shorting increases from about 19.8% of volume at t−2 to
about 21.5% at t +1 for the most negative surprises (Q1). This pattern is also
confirmed in Panel B of Table 4: the change in shorting from (−6, −2) to
(+2, +6) around the announcement date is 1.28% for Q1, which is statistically
significant at the 1% level. Second, the main adjustment to shorting activity
for Q1 occurs on the day after the announcement, so it seems that short sellers
indeed react to the information and corresponding market reaction on that day.
Both of these observations support our first hypothesis. Finally, daily returns
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Figure 1
Daily shorting activity and CARs around earnings announcements
Each quarter between January 2005 and December 2007, stocks are sorted into quartiles (Q1 to Q4) according
to earnings surprises calculated as the difference between the actual earnings and analyst consensus estimates,
scaled by the share price two days prior to the announcement. Panel A represents the daily shorting and CARs
for the most negative quartile (Q1). Panel B splits the Q1 sample based on the change in shorting from the week
before the announcement to the week after. High (low) refers to an above- (below-) median change in shorting.
CAR is defined as a stock’s raw return minus the value-weighted market returns.
move in the direction of the change in shorting: for increases in shorting, we
observe a contemporaneous negative return.
In Panel B, we split the Q1 sample based on the change in shorting
from the week before the announcement to the week after (more precisely,
the change from (−6,−2) to (+2, +6) relative to the announcement date).
High-shorting events are Q1 announcements with an above-median change
in shorting and conversely for low-shorting events. Both the high-shorting
and low-shorting portfolios are associated with large negative returns after
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Table 5
Post-earnings announcement drift of portfolios double-sorted on earnings surprises and changes in
shorting activity
Post-earnings announcement drift (2,6) Post-earnings announcement drift (2,11)
Change in shorting Change in shorting
Low High t-Statistic
(Low - high)
Low High t-Statistic
(Low - high)
Earnings surprise
Q1(Most negative) −1.54% *** −0.11% −8.10 *** −1.77% *** 0.00% −7.15 ***
t-Statistic −10.91 −1.00 −9.05 −0.01
Q2 (Second most negative) −0.77% *** 0.37% *** −9.23 −0.89% *** 0.35% *** −7.97 ***
t-Statistic −8.20 4.62 −7.87 3.27
This table reports mean post-earnings announcement drift of firms sorted on earnings surprises and changes in shorting
activity around earnings announcements for NYSE-listed common stocks from January 2005 to December 2007. Each
quarter, stocks are sorted into quartiles, according to earnings surprises calculated as the difference between the actual
number and analyst consensus, scaled by stock prices two days prior to the announcement and then split into two groups
based on the median change in average shorting from one week before to one week after the announcement. This table
shows only the two most negative surprise quartiles. The drift is calculated as market-adjusted cumulative abnormal
returns. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively.
the announcement, but drift is eliminated only in the high-shorting portfolio.
Although we can only speculate why short sellers do not increase shorting
in the low-shorting portfolio, the finding that PEAD goes away when short
sellers choose to become more active supports our main conclusion so far: short
sellers help the price-discovery process and make prices more informationally
efficient.16
The finding that PEAD vanishes after negative earnings surprises with
large increases in short selling is consistent with our second hypothesis. We
now present a more formal test related to this finding. Each quarter, we sort
stocks into quartiles based on earnings surprises. Within each earnings surprise
quartile, we again partition stocks into two groups based on changes in shorting
activity around the announcement. Table 5 reports one- and two-week post-
earnings-announcement drift for this double sort for negative surprises. Again,
the evidence suggests that more shorting enhances efficiency, in this case
by reducing the drift. Using the one-week drift, stocks with very negative
earnings surprises (Q1) and large increases in shorting exhibit no drift—the
post-announcement CAR is 11 bp and not statistically different from zero.
In contrast, the corresponding low-shorting portfolio experiences a drift of
−154 bp. It is not entirely clear to us why short sellers do not arbitrage this
154 bp drift in the same way as they remove the drift in the high-shorting
portfolio. But, even with a return this large, it is possible that it is not sufficient
to cover round-trip transaction costs, because traders must short into a declining
market to take advantage of this temporary mispricing. (Unfortunately, we
16 The firms in the low-shorting Q1 portfolio are not substantially different from firms in the high-shorting Q1
portfolio along dimensions that are commonly associated with shorting difficulty, such as price level and
institutional holdings. Moreover, none of the results in this section are sensitive to the presence of the uptick
rule—results are qualitatively identical for pilot and nonpilot stocks.
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cannot observe the return that would have accrued to the high-shorting portfolio
had the shorting not increased—but it could possibly be even larger.) If expected
transaction costs are high, arbitrage is risky ex ante, and this may prevent traders
from establishing a large short position designed to take advantage of the drift.
Alternatively, PEAD could arise partly because prices are slow to adjust and
partly because of other reasons that do not involve mispricing (Sadka 2006).
In this case, realized drift would overstate the return arbitrageurs can earn.
But, traders in the high-shorting group do bring prices closer to fundamentals,
and we obtain almost identical results for a two-week window. Overall, these
event-based results provide additional support for the hypothesis that short
sellers help make prices more efficient.
Recognizing that other factors influence the magnitude of the PEAD, we
use regression analysis to incorporate critical control variables. To estimate the
effect of shorting on PEAD that cannot be attributed to those other factors, we
estimate the following regression model:
CumMktAdjReti,t =α+β1DUEi,t +β2 DUEi,t ∗DSi,t
+β3DUEi,t ∗DInstOwni,t +β4DUEi,t ∗DTOi,t
+β5DUEi,t ∗DSizei,t +εi,t. (5)
The dependent variable is the cumulative market-adjusted abnormal return from
day 2 to day 6. DUE represents the scaled decile ranking of earnings surprises
(Bartov, Radhakrishman, and Krinsky 2000). Specifically, each quarter, we sort
unexpected earnings into deciles and scale decile ranks to range between zero
(most negative earnings surprises) and one (most positive earnings surprises).
With nonzero PEAD, we expect a positive coefficient on β1. To estimate the
marginal effect of shorting on the slope of DUE, we include DUE*DSS,
the interaction between DUE and a scaled decile rank variable representing
changes in daily average shorting activity from (−6, −2) to (+2, +6) around
earnings announcements. Specifically, each quarter, we sort the change in
shorting activity in descending order. We form deciles and scale the ranks
to range from zero (largest increase in shorting) to one (largest decrease in
shorting). If short sellers attempt to exploit PEAD and have an important
effect on post-announcement prices, β2 should be negative: firms with negative
earnings surprises and a greater increase in shorting should exhibit smaller drift.
We include additional controls suggested in the literature. Following
Bartov, Radhakrishman, and Krinsky (2000), all controls are in the form
of decile ranks interacted with DUE. Bartov, Radhakrishman, and Krinsky
(2000) and Ke and Ramalingegowda (2005) show that institutional investors
are sophisticated investors who exploit earnings patterns, so we include last-
quarter institutional holdings scaled by shares outstanding as a control. We
also include several variables that proxy for liquidity, which may be associated
with earnings drift (Chordia et al. 2009; Sadka 2006). These liquidity proxies
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Table 6
Regression analysis of the impact of short selling on PEAD
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Coef p-Value Coef p-Value Coef p-Value Coef p-Value
Intercept −0.0084 0.00 −0.0080 0.00 −0.0080 0.00 −0.0080 0.00
DUE 0.0295 0.00 0.0299 0.00 0.0318 0.00 0.0323 0.00
DUE*DSS −0.0291 0.00 −0.0302 0.00 −0.0304 0.00 −0.0304 0.00
DUE*DInstOwn 0.0002 0.93 0.0030 0.17 0.0029 0.18
DUE*DTO −0.0066 0.00 −0.0065 0.00
DUE*Dsize −0.0013 0.52
Adjusted R2 0.0244 0.0265 0.0271 0.0271
This table shows regressions of the post-earnings announcement drift for NYSE-listed common stocks from
January 2005 to December 2007. The dependent variable is the market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns
from day 2 to day 6 following the earnings announcement date. Each quarter, UE, InstOwn, TO, and Size are
sorted in an ascending order into deciles, and SS is sorted in a descending order into deciles. For each variable,
the “D” prefix indicates the respective decile ranks that are scaled to range between zero and one. UE is calculated
as the difference between actual earnings and the analyst consensus estimate, scaled by the share price two days
prior to the announcement. SS is the change in short selling from (−6,−2) to (+2, +6) around the announcement
date. InstOwn is the institutional ownership as a fraction of shares outstanding in the most recent quarter. TO is
the average daily turnover one week before the announcement. Size is the market cap in the most recent quarter.
include dummy variables of the average daily turnover one week prior to the
announcement (DTO) and firm size in last quarter (DSize).17
Table 6 reports the regression results. Consistent with our expectations,
the coefficient on DUE is significantly positive, suggesting that negative
earnings surprises are followed by downward drift. Institutional ownership
is not significant, possibly because of a relatively short sample period with
low-frequency data. Turnover, as a proxy for liquidity, significantly reduces
drift, consistent with Chordia et al. (2009) and Sadka (2006). Our key variable,
DUE*DSS, is significantly negative across all model specifications. So,
PEAD is significantly smaller when short sellers act on arbitrage opportunities
associated with PEAD, beyond the effect that cross-sectional differences in
liquidity have. In the process of arbitraging PEAD, short-selling activity
improves the informational efficiency of prices.
6. Short Selling and Extreme Price Movements
Short sellers tend to be contrarians who sell more after periods of positive
returns. At an annual frequency, Dechow et al. (2001) show that changes in
short interest are positively related to changes in prices. They suggest that short
sellers take positions in stocks that experience price run-ups and then cover as
prices decline. Diether, Lee, and Werner (2008) show that short sellers are also
contrarians at a daily horizon. But, two recent studies provide evidence that, in
certain situations, some short sellers destabilize prices by driving prices away
from efficient values. Shkilko, Van Ness, and Van Ness (2012) find that some
17 We also use quartile ranks instead of decile ranks and above-below-median dummies in shorting change. This
leaves the results qualitatively unaltered and largely reproduces the results from our double sorts.
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short sellers drive down prices too far during extreme price declines. Similarly,
Henry and Koski (2010) argue that short sellers are able to push prices too
far down just before seasoned equity offerings. Although the objective of our
article is to assess the average effect of short sellers as a group, it is useful to
extend our analysis in this direction.
More specifically, we look at short selling around extreme price moves
and those price moves that are quickly reversed. By definition, price changes
that reverse quickly involve no new information—otherwise the price change
should be permanent. Such no-information price reversals could arise, for
example, when index funds experience outflows and thus become obliged to
sell a large quantity of shares. This would temporarily lower prices, inducing
other traders to buy these shares. Once the selling pressure subsides, in the
absence of stock-specific negative information, prices would then return to the
level prior to the large sell. If short sellers are smart traders who understand that
the initial negative return is transient, we expect them to reduce their shorting
while prices are (temporarily) below their efficient values.
Analysis of these no-information events can shed light on two central issues
in the short-selling debate: whether short sellers cause the no-information
price declines and how short sellers react to no-information price declines.
Regarding the first issue, the SEC is expressly concerned that short selling may
cause “sudden and excessive fluctuations of the prices.”18 If nefarious short
sellers destabilize prices, we expect more intense shorting on extreme down
days, especially when the downward price change is unrelated to fundamental
information. Conversely, if short sellers help keep prices in line and close
to their efficient values, we expect them to short less on extreme down days,
especially when the initial price shock is unrelated to fundamental information.
Subsequent to extreme returns, we could expect nefarious traders to increase
shorting after observing large downward price changes in the hope of covering
at still lower prices. In contrast, efficiency-enhancing short sellers would reduce
sales after observing no-information price declines (and perhaps purchase
shares, but we do not observe this in our data).
To identify extreme return days for each stock, we make subjective decisions
regarding the length of return windows, the nature of price reversals, and the
definition of “extreme” returns. We select days with returns exceeding two
standard deviations measured over the past twenty trading days. We classify
these events into one of four categories, depending on what happens on the
next day: a continuation, a small reversal, a large reversal, or an overshooting
reversal. If we have a large negative return on day t , a continuation is any
nonpositive return on day t +1. A reversal of less than 20% of the down day’s
return would be classified as a small reversal, and one that reaches more than
20% but remains below the closing price on day t−1 is a large reversal. An
18 See SEC Release No. 34-58592.
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overshooting reversal means that the closing price on day t +1 exceeds the
closing price on day t−1. We proceed analogously for extreme positive returns
events, but our main focus in this section is on extreme negative price shocks.
In Figure 2, we graph daily time series of cumulative returns and short
selling around extreme return events. The four panels correspond to the type
of reversal on day t +1. In addition to the graphical discussion, we test whether
day 0 returns and the next-day reversal magnitudes are significantly linked
to contemporaneous short selling. Specifically, we regress day 0 returns and
Figure 2
Short selling around large negative return days
PanelsA, B, C, and D show relative shorting volume around large negative return days followed by continuation, a
small reversal, a large reversal, and an overshooting reversal the next day, respectively. Large negative return days
indicate down days when a stock’s return is below twice its twenty-day moving standard deviation. Continuation
refers to the case in which the next day’s return keeps going down (17,113 observations). A small reversal refers
to the case in which the next day’s return is positive but reverses by less than 20% of the down day’s return
(3,822). A large reversal refers to the case in which the next day’s return reverses by more than 20% but less
than 100% of the down day’s return (7,815). An overshooting reversal indicates a reversal to a price higher than
the one on the day prior to the down day (2,519). Relative shorting volume is shorting volume standardized by
trading volume. Return is raw return in excess of CRSP value-weighted return.
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Table 7
Short selling around extreme negative returns and their subsequent reversal
Dependent variable R(t = 0) |R(t = 1)| / |R(t = 0)|
Coef p-Value Coef p-Value
Intercept −0.054 0.00 0.303 0.00
abnShorting 0.003 0.18 0.311 0.00
abnOIB −0.002 0.02 0.117 0.00
abnTurnover −0.631 0.00 −1.504 0.00
abnVolatility −0.555 0.00 6.254 0.00
abnRES 0.256 0.01 −18.372 0.00
lnsize 0.001 0.00 0.000 0.94
LnVWAP 0.004 0.00 0.018 0.04
InstOwn 0.002 0.01 0.030 0.26
LnNumAnalyst*100 0.000 0.118 −0.003 0.75
Adjusted R2 0.69 0.04
This table presents regression analysis of shorting around large negative returns on day t = 0 that are followed
by a reversal on the next day (t = 1). The dependent variable captures the reversal magnitude and is defined as
|R(t = 1)| / |R(t = 0)|, where R is the excess return over the CRSP value-weighted market return. Shorting is
shorting volume scaled by trading volume. Turnover is measured as shares traded divided by shares outstanding.
OIB refers to daily relative share order imbalance (the difference between buys and sells standardized by trading
volume). Volatility refers to intraday volatility measured as the max. price minus min. price and then scaled
by VWAP. RES is trade-weighted relative effective spread. Shorting, OIB, Turnover, Volatility, and RES are
expressed as abnormal measures, defined as the difference between the day t value and the corresponding past
twenty-day moving average. Size is the market capitalization two days before the reversal event. VWAP is the
volume-weighted average price two days before the reversal event. InstOwn refers to institutional ownership
relative to total shares outstanding in the most recent quarter before the event. NumAnalyst*100 is the number of
sell-side analysts producing annual forecast of firm earnings (scaled up by 100) in the most recent month before
the event.  indicates changes between day 1 and day 0. Ln refers to the natural logarithm.
reversal magnitudes (measured as the absolute value of day 1 returns divided
by day 0 returns) on abnormal short selling and the same controls as in
Table 2. Abnormal short selling is defined as the change in shorting on day 0
or day 1 relative to the preceding twenty-day historical average (using, as
before, shares shorted normalized by trading volume). If extreme returns are
indeed information free and short sellers’ trading pushes prices toward their
efficient values, we expect that shorting should decrease on day 0 and increase
on day 1, and it should increase more when the next-day reversal is larger.
Thus, the coefficients on abnormal shorting should be positive in both regression
models if short sellers improve efficiency around extreme return events. Table 7
contains the estimated coefficients from these models. We limit our discussion
to extreme negative returns but obtain an almost exact mirror image when we
repeat the analysis on analogously defined positive return shocks.19
19 We present both the graphs and the regressions using daily market-adjusted returns, but the results are qualitatively
identical when we use raw returns to identify extreme return events and subsequent price reactions. We obtain
qualitatively identical results when we include shorting on day -1 in the first regression. Moreover, all results
in this section are robust to reasonable variations of the assumptions: changing the break points for reversal
categories (replacing the 20% cutoff with 10% or 30% cutoffs), lengthening the window over which extreme
returns are defined (from 10 days to 20, 30, 60, or 90 days), excluding earnings announcement dates from
these extreme return events, or examining pilot and control stocks separately all leave the results qualitatively
unchanged.
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We first examine shorting around the large negative day 0 returns in Figure 2.
The price drop averages about 4%–5% across the four panels. By construction,
the shock in Panel A experiences a continuation on the next day, and we do
not know whether or not the returns are eventually reversed or whether new
information is partly responsible for these events. We show the continuation
graphs for completeness but focus on Panels B through D, where returns reverse
on the next day. Here, we know that the day 0 return shocks are transient and can
investigate whether short sellers trade as if they understand that these returns are
not information based. If shorters attempted to manipulate prices or exacerbate
price declines for these reversals, we would expect shorting to increase, either
on the down day or before. None of the graphs supports this conjecture: shorting
is fairly flat before the drop in all cases and then declines dramatically on the
day of the price decline. Controlling for several relevant variables, the shorting
coefficient in the first regression in Table 7 is not significantly different from
zero. Taken together, these results suggest that short sellers, as a group, do not
worsen the price decline on day 0. If anything, they reduce their activity as
suggested by Figure 2.
Next, we look at the magnitude of day 1 returns relative to the magnitude of
the day 0 shock. In Panel A, these returns are negative; in all other panels, they
are positive, and by construction these returns increase monotonically from
Panel A to Panel D relative to the day 0 price decline. If the extreme price
declines on the previous day are temporary and short sellers interpret them
correctly, we would expect shorting on day 1 to increase with the magnitude of
the reversal. For example, if prices reverse partially (Panel B), informed short
sellers may expect further reversal and limit their trading activity. In Panel D,
we expect the informed short seller to trade more intensely during and after
the overshooting reversals because if there is no new information, prices have
increased too much. The day 1 results are consistent with these arguments. In
Panel A, price declines continue and shorting remains low. On days with small
reversals (Panel B), short selling increases slightly from day t but remains
substantially lower than before the shock for the next five trading days. On days
with large reversals (Panel C), short sellers resume their pre-event activity level
quickly. Finally, for the overshooting returns (Panel D), short sellers increase
their shorting activity the most. Notably, day 1 shorting activity is monotoni-
cally related to the reversal magnitude: we observe more short selling relative
to pre-event means as we move from Panel A to Panel D. The second regression
in Table 7 shows that the relation between shorting and reversal magnitude is
statistically meaningful. Adding controls, short selling is positively related to
the reversal magnitude, and the coefficient is significant at the 1% level. Both
the time-series graphs and the regression tests are consistent with the view that
short sellers trade to keep prices in line with their efficient values.20
20 Results for the opposite event (extreme positive returns) yield almost exact mirror-image results. We again
classify stocks into four categories in accordance with t +1 returns. As we would expect for short sellers who
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Overall, these results are consistent with Dechow et al.’s (2001) and Diether,
Lee, and Werner (2008) findings that short sellers act as contrarians. But, our
results are inconsistent with Shkilko, Van Ness, and Van Ness (2012), who argue
that short sellers worsen price declines around extreme return days. Contrary to
their interpretation of shorting around negative return events, we show that short
sellers’ trading helps accelerate price discovery during these extreme events.
Shorters sell more when prices jump unusually high, they short less when
prices drop unusually low, and they swiftly change their behavior as prices
reverse—all consistent with efficiency-enhancing trading patterns. Moreover,
for extreme returns that are reversed on the next day, short sellers appear to
recognize the temporary nature of these price swings. As a result, their trading
provides liquidity to the market and keeps prices in line, even during these
volatile episodes.
7. Robustness
Our key finding is that daily short-selling activities facilitate price discovery
and make prices more informationally efficient. We provide evidence along four
dimensions of efficiency by looking at how short selling relates to deviations
of transaction prices from a random walk, low-frequency price delays, post-
earnings-announcement drift in event time, and non-information-based large
price movements. We view the transaction-based analysis as the strongest
convincing argument in this set and discuss additional sensitivity tests in this
direction.
7.1 The effect of short-selling constraints
When traders face shorting constraints, theory tells us that negative information
is not fully incorporated into prices (Miller 1977) or more slowly (Diamond
and Verrecchia 1987) than without shorting constraints. This slows price
discovery, and we expect the informational efficiency of prices to decline with
the stringency of shorting constraints. We conduct a supplemental experiment in
this regard and look at the Reg SHO experiment between 2005 and 2007, which
exempted one-third of the Russell 3000 stocks (a volume-stratified sample)
from the uptick rule. We conduct a difference-in-difference experiment that
compares the effect of shorting “pilot” stocks (not subject to the uptick rule)
to the effect of shorting the volume-matched set of other stocks in the pre- and
post-Reg SHO periods.21
view the positive return as transient, the day 0 price increases are associated with a substantial increase in shorting
activity in each case. This is consistent with the contrarian nature of short selling (see Diether, Lee, and Werner
2008). Equally important, and similar to Figure 2, we find that shorting on day 1 is monotonically related to the
magnitude of return reversals. Shorting is highest when prices continue to increase and lowest when prices fall
below their day -1 level.
21 The uptick rule, commonly known as the tick test, requires that short selling in exchange-listed stocks occur only
at an uptick or a zero-plus tick. That is, short sales in these stocks need to transact above the last trade price or
314
[11:21 28/12/2012 OEP-hhs097.tex] Page: 315 287–322
Short Selling and the Price Discovery Process
To implement this test, we augment Model 2 in Table 2 with three
additional variables: a “pilot” dummy, indicating pilot stocks; a “post” dummy,
indicating the period over which price tests were removed for pilot stocks;
and an interaction pilot*post*Shorting. The interaction coefficient represents
a difference-in-difference test of the impact of removing the uptick rule on
informational efficiency. In this test (not tabulated), the main results from
Table 2 still hold. Importantly, the interaction coefficient is −0.005 and
significant at the 1% level. Comparing it to the main shorting coefficient in
this model, −0.029, this implies that the efficiency-enhancing effect of short
selling becomes 0.005/0.029 = 17% stronger when the uptick rule is removed.
7.2 Distribution of shorting flow
Shorting flow is skewed. To assure that distributional issues do not affect our
results, we use decile ranks in place of shorting flow to test for efficiency
effects. Specifically, on each day, we sort stocks into deciles based on the prior
day’s relative shorting volume. Then, we use the decile ranks in regression
model (3). This approach reduces the influence of outliers on the estimates.
Our main finding (not tabulated) remains unchanged with this alternative
shorting measure: stocks ranked higher in terms of relative shorting flow are
associated with significantly smaller values of both pricing errors and return
autocorrelations.
7.3 Influence of unobservable firm effects
Our high-frequency results may also be affected by firm-specific effects. To
address this possibility, we construct a measure of “abnormal” shorting. Each
day, we compare a stock’s relative shorting volume to its own moving average
over the past week to determine whether shorting has become more or less
intense. This way we identify stocks that experience a shock in their own
shorting activity and take into account potential persistence in a firm’s shorting
activity. Another way of addressing stock fixed effects is to model them directly
in a panel regression. This methodology mitigates the omitted-variable concern
with cross-sectional OLS regressions. Both the abnormal-shorting tests and
the fixed-effect panel regressions produce qualitatively identical results (not
at the last trade price if the last trade price is higher than the most recent trade at a different price. Because the
SEC eliminated the uptick rule for all stocks on July 6, 2007, our sample for this analysis includes pilot stocks
and control stocks from January 1, 2005, to July 5, 2007. The SEC selected pilot securities from the Russell
3000 index as of June 25, 2004. First, thirty-two securities in the Russell 3000 index that are neither listed on the
American Stock Exchange (AMEX), nor on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), nor on NASDAQ national
market securities (NNM) are dropped. Securities that went public after April 30, 2004, are also excluded. The
remaining securities are then sorted into three groups by marketplace and ranked in each group based on average
daily dollar volume over the one year prior to the issuance of the order. From each ranked group, the SEC selected
every third stock to be a pilot stock starting from the second stock. The remaining stocks are suggested to be
used as the control group, where the price test restriction still applies. Of all pilot stocks, 50%, 2.2%, and 47.8%
are from NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ NNM, respectively. For more information about Reg SHO, see SEC
Release No. 50104/July 28, 2004.
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tabulated): stocks with higher abnormal shorting are priced more efficiently as
observed by smaller pricing errors and autocorrelations.
We also consider additional controls. We include lagged two-week returns
to control for short-term momentum. Again, the inclusion of this variable
does not remove the effect of shorting on price efficiency. We use turnover
in place of log volume in the regressions. To the extent that turnover serves
as a proxy for investor attention (see, e.g., Chordia and Swaminathan 2000), it
could be related to price efficiency because high-volume stocks tend to respond
more quickly to information in market returns than do low-volume stocks. We
find that increased turnover makes prices more efficient, but shorting remains
significant as well.22
7.4 Reverse causality
Reverse causality is an important issue that we have not yet formally
addressed. It is important, because a plausible story links efficiency to shorting.
Institutional investors may prefer to hold efficiently priced stocks because they
are less likely to be mispriced. But, stocks with higher institutional holdings
are also easier to short (Nagel 2005), because the supply of lendable shares
is greater in these stocks. Therefore, efficiently priced stocks may exhibit
more shorting activity. If efficiency and shorting are sufficiently persistent, this
reverse-causality story could explain the association between efficiency and
shorting flow. Although we use prior-day shorting in our analysis to mitigate
this concern, we now address it more rigorously.
In the spirit of Granger causality tests, we regress time-series changes in
efficiency on lagged time-series changes in shorting for each stock, using
the same set of control variables as in Table 2. In contrast to the cross-
sectional regressions reported in Table 2, we now construct first differences
in all variables and estimate a time-series regression for each stock. We require
a stock to be actively traded for at least forty-five days during the sample period
to obtain reliable time-series regression estimates. Table 8 reports the cross-
sectional mean coefficients from these time-series models. Panel A shows that
greater increases in shorting are strongly associated with a greater next-day
improvement in efficiency.
To examine reverse causality, we regress changes in shorting on lagged
changes in price efficiency using the same controls. Panel B shows that the
average coefficient of the lagged change in price efficiency, measured by either
the pricing error or the absolute value of autocorrelations, is not significantly
related to changes in shorting at the 5% level. This indicates that changes in
shorting are not systematically related to prior changes in price efficiency.
It is comforting that the time-series results closely parallel those from the
22 We also use residual turnover by orthogonalizing turnover with respect to other control variables in the regression.
Shorting still exhibits a reliably negative coefficient.
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Table 8
Granger causality tests of changes in price efficiency and changes in shorting activity
Panel A: Dependent variable is change in price efficiency (Efficiency)
σ (s)/σ (p) σ (s)/σ (p) Ln|AR30| Ln|AR30|
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Coef p-Value Coef p-Value Coef p-Value Coef p-Value
Intercept 0.0004 0.00 −0.0001 0.69 0.0003 0.23 −0.0002 0.86
Lag Efficiency −0.472 0.00 −0.473 0.00 −0.497 0.00 −0.496 0.00
Lag Shorting −0.011 0.00 −0.009 0.00 −0.062 0.00 −0.075 0.00
Lag LnVWAP 0.076 0.22 0.064 0.41 −0.396 0.08 −0.442 0.12
Lag LnSize 0.036 0.35 0.038 0.52 0.908 0.00 1.089 0.02
Lag LnVolume −0.004 0.00 −0.003 0.00 −0.002 0.52 0.000 0.91
Lag RES 1.870 0.00 1.174 0.12 −8.842 0.28 −17.461 0.13
Lag |OIB| 0.004 0.00 0.003 0.00 0.013 0.32 0.013 0.39
Lag InstOwn 0.010 0.20 0.008 0.88
LagLnNumest*100 0.000 0.85 0.009 0.14
Adjusted R2 0.220 0.221 0.250 0.247
Panel B: Dependent variable is change in relative shorting (Shorting)
Intercept 0.0001 0.11 0.0002 0.30 −0.0003 0.00 −0.0001 0.66
Lag Efficiency −0.002 0.24 −0.004 0.15 −0.0001 0.07 −0.0001 0.14
Lag Shorting −0.401 0.00 −0.398 0.00 −0.403 0.00 −0.399 0.00
Lag LnVWAP −0.337 0.00 −0.393 0.00 −0.359 0.00 −0.394 0.00
Lag LnSize 0.255 0.00 0.279 0.00 0.251 0.00 0.273 0.00
Lag LnVolume 0.002 0.00 0.002 0.00 0.003 0.00 0.002 0.00
Lag RES −0.392 0.25 −0.524 0.25 −0.270 0.43 −0.409 0.37
Lag |OIB| 0.004 0.00 0.004 0.00 0.003 0.00 0.004 0.00
Lag InstOwn −0.005 0.27 −0.006 0.13
LagLnNumest*100 −0.00001 0.98 −0.001 0.22
Adjusted R2 0.167 0.163 0.170 0.164
This table reports cross-sectional averages of time-series Granger causality regression results for NYSE-listed
common stocks from Janusary 2005 to December 2007. σ (s) is the standard deviation of the discrepancies
between log transaction price and the efficient price based on Hasbrouck (1993). σ (p) is the standard deviation of
intraday transaction prices. |AR30| is the absolute value of the thirty-minute quote midpoint return autocorrelation.
Shorting is shares shorted standardized by shares traded on a given stock day. VWAP is daily volume-weighted
average price. Size is the market value of equity. Volume is daily share trading volume orthogonalized with
respect to size. RES is daily value-weighted relative effective spreads. |OIB| is the absolute value of daily
share order imbalance standardized by share volume, where order imbalance is the difference between buyer-
initiated trades and seller-initiated trades based on Lee and Ready’s (1991) algorithm. InstOwn is the fraction
of shares outstanding owned by institutions. NumAnalyst*100 is the number of sell-side analysts producing
annual forecast of firm earnings (scaled up by 100). Ln represents the natural logarithm.  indicates first-order
difference. Lag refers to the first-order lagged value. Daily variables are lagged one day, InstOwn is lagged
one quarter, and NumAnalyst is lagged one month. Efficiency refers to σ (s)/σ (p) or Ln|AR30|. The dependent
variable is Efficiency in Panel A and Shorting in Panel B.
cross-sectional analysis and that they are not easily explainable using a reverse-
causality story. It is also reassuring that the inferences from Table 2 hold in a
time-series test using first differences.
Finally, some observations from additional tests (not reported) can shed
additional light on the causality between shorting and efficiency. First, short
sales became less constrained when the SEC removed the tick-test requirement
for Reg SHO “pilot” stocks. To the extent that the Reg SHO selection of
pilot firms is at least partly exogenous, these additional results are informative
about causality. We find that the total effect of shorting on efficiency is lower
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when shorting is more constrained. These findings make the reverse-causality
explanation harder to sustain.
8. Conclusions
We examine how daily short-selling flow affects price discovery, the process
by which new information becomes incorporated into security prices. We
link short-selling activity to four different measures of relative informational
efficiency and show that short sellers help keep prices in line with fundamentals.
With more shorting, transaction prices follow a random walk more closely,
monthly and annual price delays become smaller, post-earnings-announcement
drift vanishes after negative earnings surprises, and extreme, non-information-
based price movements become less pronounced. These results are fairly robust
to different econometric approaches and model specifications, and we argue that
reverse-causality explanations are hard to sustain.
Taken together, these different empirical approaches all suggest that short
sellers’ trading contributes significantly to price discovery in equity markets.
Short selling is associated with more efficient pricing in the sense that prices
appear to be closer to efficient or fundamental values when short sellers are more
active. Our results suggest that the efficiency-enhancing effect of short sales
affects prices quickly. Moreover, the magnitude of the effect of short sales on
price efficiency is about the same as that associated with institutional holdings
and is roughly three times that associated with analyst coverage. Conversely,
we find no evidence that hints at price destabilizing or manipulative trading by
short sellers.
Given the sustained worldwide regulatory interest in short selling and its
effect on markets, our results have important implications, especially for recent
regulatory actions that restrict short selling. Our results suggest that these
restrictions constrain a particularly informed type of trading and are likely
to impede the price-discovery function of equity markets.
Appendix
This Appendix presents the estimation of the pricing error. The notations closely follow those in
Hasbrouck (1993). Hasbrouck assumes that the observed (log) transaction price at time t , pt , can
be decomposed into an efficient price, mt , and the pricing error, st :
pt =mt +st, (A1)
where mt is defined as the security’s expected value conditional on all available information at
transaction time t . By definition, mt only moves in response to new information and is assumed to
follow a random walk. The pricing error st measures the deviation relative to the efficient price. It
captures non-information-related market frictions (such as price discreteness and inventory control
effects, etc.). st is assumed to be a zero-mean covariance-stationary process, and it can be serially
correlated or correlated with the innovation from the random walk of efficient prices. Because the
expected value of the deviations is zero, the standard deviation of the pricing error, σ (s), measures
the magnitude of deviations from the efficient price and can be interpreted as a measure of price
efficiency for the purpose of assessing market quality.
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In the empirical implementation, Hasbrouck (1993) estimates the following vector
autoregression (VAR) system with five lags:
rt =a1rt−1 +a2rt−2 + ···+b1xt−1 +b2xt−2 + ···+v1,t
xt =c1rt−1 +c2rt−2 + ···+d1xt−1 +d2xt−2 + ···+v2,t , (A2)
where rt is the difference in (log) prices pt , and xt is a column vector of trade-related variables: a
trade sign indicator, signed trading volume, and signed square root of trading volume to allow
for concavity between prices and trades. v1,t and v2,t are zero-mean, serially uncorrelated
disturbances from the return equation and the trade equation, respectively.
The above VAR can be inverted to obtain its vector moving average (VMA) representation that
expresses the variables in terms of contemporaneous and lagged disturbances:
rt =a
∗
0 v1,t +a
∗
1 v1,t−1 +a∗2 v1,t−2 + ···+b∗0 v2,t +b∗1 v2,t−1 +b∗2 v2,t−2 + ···
xt =c
∗
0 v1,t +c
∗
1 v1,t−1 +c∗2 v1,t−2 + ···+d∗0 v2,t +d∗1 v2,t−1 +d∗2 v2,t−2 + ··· . (A3)
To calculate the pricing error, only the return equation in (A3) is used. The pricing error under
Beveridge and Nelson’s (1981) identification restriction can be expressed as
st =α0v1,t +α1v1,t−1 + ···+β0v2,t +β1v2,t−1 + ··· , (A4)
where αj =−
∞∑
k=j+1
a∗
k , βj =−
∞∑
k=j+1
b∗k . The variance of the pricing error is then computed as
σ 2(s) =
∞∑
j=0
[αj,βj ]Cov(v)
[
αj
βj
]
. (A5)
In the estimation, all transactions in TAQ that satisfy certain criteria are included.23 Following
Hasbrouck (1993), we exclude overnight returns. We use Lee and Ready’s (1991) algorithm to
assign trade directions but make no time adjustment (Bessembinder 2003). To make comparisons
across stocks meaningful, σ (s) is scaled by the standard deviation of pt , σ (p), to control for cross-
sectional differences in the return variance. This ratio σ (s)/σ (p) reflects the proportion of deviations
from the efficient price in the total variability of the observable transaction price process. Therefore,
it serves as a natural measure of the informational efficiency of prices. Because the pricing error
is inversely related to price efficiency, a smaller ratio means a more efficient stock price.24 In the
empirical analysis, this ratio is referred to as “pricing error” for brevity.
23 Trades and quotes during regular market hours are used. For trades, we require that TAQ’s CORR field is equal
to zero and the COND field is either blank or equal to *, B, E, J, or K. Trades with nonpositive prices or sizes
are eliminated. A trade with a price greater than 150% or less than 50% of the price of the previous trade is also
excluded. For quotes, we include only those with positive depth for which TAQ’s MODE field is equal to 1, 2, 3,
6, 10, or 12. Quotes with nonpositive ask or bid prices or where the bid price is higher than the ask price are also
excluded. A quote with an ask that is greater than 150% of the bid is also excluded. For each stock, we aggregate
all trades during the same second then execute at the same price and retain only the last quote for every second
if multiple quotes are reported.
24 As pointed out by Hasbrouck (1993), if temporary deviations from the efficient price take too long to correct,
pricing errors will be understated because deviations are erroneously attributed to changes in efficient price. This
potential limitation is not a major concern in this study for two reasons. First, our analysis examines the relative
efficiency of prices instead of price efficiency in an absolute sense. Second, the empirical tests focus on the
cross-section of stocks, and this potential measurement error is unlikely to be highly systematic across stocks.
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